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Summary
Economists and sociologists disagree over markets' potential to assume functions
typically performed by networks of personal connections, first among them the
transmission of information. This paper begins from a model of labor markets where
social ties are stronger between similar individuals and firms employing productive
workers prefer to rely on personal referrals than to hire on the anonymous market
(Montgomery (1991). However, we allow workers in the market to engage in a costly
action that can signal their high productivity, and ask whether the possibility of
signaling reduces the reliance on the network. We find that the network is remarkably
resilient. To be effective signaling must fulfill two contradictory requirements: unless
the signal is extremely precise, it must be expensive or it is not informative; but it must
be cheap, or the network can undercut it.
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Personalized networks, systems of personal connections that function as privileged chan-
nels of information and trust, are part of daily experience. In situations where the reliability
of information is particularly important - when applying for a job, when needing fresh capital
for a new enterprise, when moving to a new country, when substituting for formal enforce-
ment -their role becomes often crucial, either as means of entering formal markets, or indeed
as substitutes for these markets. Hence the ethnic enclaves, both residential and profes-
sional, in New York City; the economic weight of the Overseas Chinese in their countries of
residence; the success of Medieval networks of merchants, organized along ethnic or religious
lines (the Armenians, the Italians, the Jews, the Dutch..). All of these phenomena have in
common the essential role played by the personal network, with its rapidity and its freedom
from the constraints of unwieldy procedures.1
As the function of the network is recognized, an important policy question is the extent to
which planned interventions or market mechanisms can substitute for personal connections.
The question is important both because the networks are often very successful, and thus it
would be good to be able to copy them, and because they are by their nature exclusionary,
and thus tend to generate resentment and opposition among those excluded. If the networks
could be replicated these delicate distributional problems could be faced.
Economists and sociologists usually disagree on the potential for arti¯cial replication of
the networks. Not surprisingly, economists tend to be more optimistic, believing that appro-
priate market mechanisms, encouraged and supported by appropriate policy where necessary,
can substitute for the missing personal channels. Sociologists on the other hand, see the per-
sonal, non-anonymous link as the essence of the relation, the fundamental, inescapable reason
not only for the truthful transmission of information, but for the \trust" that accompanies
1See, among many others, Braudel (1982), Greif (1993), Kotkin (1992), Rauch (2001), and Redding
(1990). The classic studies of personal referrals in labor markets are Rees (1966) and Granovetter (1974). A
large literature focussing on labor markets has emerged since, starting with Saloner (1985), Holzer (1988),
Staiger (1990), Montgomery (1991), Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994). Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004)
provides an exhaustive review.
2the exchange, that trust that can never be approximated by fear of punishment (e.g. Tienda
and Raijman (2001), discussing Rauch (2001)).
In this paper, we approach the issue by focusing on one channel of information transmis-
sion that seems a plausible alternative to personalized exchanges taking place in a network:
the possibility of signaling. Individuals who are not part of the network can take a costly
action that signals high productivity, the only relevant information in our model. The ques-
tion we ask is how e®ective the availability of the signal is in weakening the reliance on the
network. We ¯nd that the network is extremely resilient - for the great majority of our
parameter space, reliance on the network continues and is pro¯table, even though signaling
does take place in the market and typically leads to more precise information than is being
revealed in the network. The reason is, ex post at least, obvious: when signaling is infor-
mative, it is caught in two contradictory requirements. On one hand, it must be e®ective in
separating the di®erent types - it must induce the more productive type to signal while the
less productive type cannot pro¯tably do so. To induce this separation, either the signal is
extremely precise, or it must be costly. But at the same time, signaling is competing with
reliance on the network - if signaling is costly enough to di®erentiate among types, then
the network is likely to be pro¯table because it can undercut the cost of information in the
market. Indeed, the savings can be enough to expand the network beyond what the acqui-
sition of useful information would dictate, where ¯rms prefer hiring through the network,
even when that implies a more than average probability of hiring a less productive worker.
In the next section, we describe the model; in section 3 we describe the main properties
of the network that will be exploited repeatedly in solving the model; section 4 characterizes
the equilibria of the model, ¯rst without and then with signaling; section 5 discusses the
resilience of the network and its causes; section 6 describes the main empirical predictions
of the model, and section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains some of the proofs.
32 The Model
A model allowing us to study the relative performance of personal connections versus
signaling must be very °exible: it must include both a network and a market, which must
di®er in some substantive way, and it must capture the equilibrium e®ects linking the two;
it must allow workers and ¯rms to choose between networking and signaling, and it must be
tractable enough to allow us to study the results' sensitivity to di®erent costs of signaling and
di®erent precisions of both mechanisms. Montgomery (1991) proposed a simple, beautiful
model that satis¯es all our requirements. We start from Montgomery's set-up and adapt it
for our purposes.
There is a potentially in¯nite number of identical in¯nitely-lived ¯rms and, at any period
in time, two overlapping generations of workers, each composed of an equal large number
of individuals. Everything we write below will apply to the limit of this number becoming
very large. Each ¯rm employs at most one worker. Workers live two periods and work in
the second period of their life. In each generation, half of the workers are productive and
produce one unit of output when employed (H workers), and half are unproductive and
produce no output (L workers). The two types of workers cannot be distinguished ex ante,
and wages cannot be made conditional on production. With some abuse of notation we will
call \H ¯rms" ¯rms whose current employee is an H worker, and \L ¯rms" ¯rms whose
current employee is of type L.
Young workers, who are not yet employed, can establish a connection to an older employed
worker at no cost. Employed workers' types are not observable outside the ¯rm, but following
Montgomery and building on sociologists' concept of \in-breeding", we assume that a young
individual will have a higher probability of establishing a link to an older worker of his own
type. More precisely, each young individual will be connected to an employed worker of his
own type with probability ® > 1=2, where ® is common knowledge. The links are otherwise
random. Personal connections can be valuable because ¯rms have the option of hiring their
new workers through referrals from their current employees, whose own productivity is known
4and who, through ®, are more likely than not to have connections to young workers of their
own type.
If a ¯rm chooses to hire through referrals, its employee transmits the o®er to one of the
young workers he is connected to (choosing randomly if he has several connections). If the
young worker accepts the o®er, the contract is concluded and the worker is hired for the next
period. Young workers who either reject the referral o®er or do not receive any, will need
to ¯nd employment in the anonymous market. Before entering the market, however, each
young worker has the option of engaging in a costly action that has the potential to announce
publicly that he is of type H - for example a worker can attempt to be certi¯ed through
an exam. The action costs ¸ and the probability of success is ¯ > 1=2 if the individual is
of type H, and (1 ¡ ¯) < 1=2 if he is of type L. We call this option "signaling". Workers
can borrow ¸ at no cost against their future labor earnings.2 Failure of certi¯cation is not
observed, and the market cannot distinguish between workers who are not certi¯ed because
they never attempted certi¯cation and those who tried but failed.
Finally, the markets for certi¯ed and non certi¯ed workers open, and all young workers
who have not been hired though referrals o®er their labor. Firms can enter these markets
freely, and expected pro¯ts from market hiring are brought down to zero. Once the new
workers are hired, the old workers retire, and a new generation of young agents is born, not
yet working but ready to network.
Our model di®ers from Montgomery's in three aspects. First, and most important, is
the possibility of signaling. The availability of this additional information channel will a®ect
the equilibrium, and we will be able to address our central question on the robustness and
relative performance of personal networks when signaling is available. Second, relative to
Montgomery's original model, we have reversed the direction of the personal ties: originating
from the young workers and randomly connecting each of them to an older worker, rather
2More generally, ¸ is the amount that will need to be repaid out of future wages if a worker decides to
signal. Hence it could include borrowing costs, and a decline in ¸ could be interpreted as, for example, more
generous conditions on loans ¯nancing extra schooling.
5than the opposite. The result is that each young connected worker will have exactly one
link to an older worker. But because the links are random, some older workers will have
several, while some will have none. The di®erence matters because it a®ects the competition
among ¯rms in making referral o®ers. We have chosen our modeling strategy because it
allows us to move naturally to the case where networking too is costly (Casella and Hanaki,
2004), but it has the added advantage of leading to a very clean analysis where, contrary to
Montgomery, we can always derive closed-form solutions. Finally, we have stream-lined the
original two-period model, occasionally cumbersome, by adopting the simpler overlapping
generations set-up that its logic suggests. Again, this is mostly a matter of taste, although
it is also true that the possibility of referrals generates a dynamic link across periods: if
having hired a H worker increases the probability of hiring another H worker next period,
the value of a H worker is higher than his immediate productivity. But because this is true
whether the H worker is hired in the market or through referrals, the ¯nal results are not
very sensitive to this change in assumptions.3
A number of assumptions can be questioned, but plausible alternatives would not change
the substance of the analysis. Because links are free, workers could be allowed to establish
more than one. But the bias in the direction of the links that distinguishes the two types,
summarized by ®, would continue to hold and to a®ect the relative probability of being
recommended to ¯rms of either type. Assuming that establishing a link requires time and
limiting the number of possible links to 1 thus seems a preferable modeling strategy. The
older worker passes on the ¯rm's job o®er to one of his connections without reaping any
surplus. This is Montgomery's original assumption and is common in the study of networks
in labor markets (see, for example, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004). It is also particularly
natural here, where the old worker has a purely passive role and the young worker reaps no
surplus, and it simpli¯es the analysis because it leaves the referral wage independent of the
speci¯c number of ties that an old worker has. But dropping it would not a®ect the substance
3A statement we have veri¯ed by solving the two-period model with signaling.
6of the model, beyond reducing the value to the ¯rm of hiring a worker who will lead to future
referrals - typically the pro¯t attached to hiring a H worker. Assigning some of the surplus
to the worker making a referral is logically very similar, in this model, to assigning some
bargaining power to the new worker being hired. Because several young workers may be
competing for the same referral o®er, the model gives all bargaining power to the ¯rm; in
our companion paper (Casella and Hanaki, 2004) we have investigated the case where ¯rms
and workers hired through referrals share expected pro¯ts, but beyond the predictable shift
in distribution the logic of the model is unchanged. A more important assumption is the
inability of the young workers to direct their links exclusively to desirable - typically H - older
workers. This is central to the random nature of the network, and thus to the model, but
is also the source of the informational content of the personal connection, together with the
\in-breeding bias." It could be read as lack of transparency of the old worker's type outside
the ¯rm, but can also represent, more realistically, the limited set of social interactions
available to the young workers. In this model where personal links are created freely, they
are best thought of as natural side-e®ects of daily social interaction, and the young workers'
propensity to connect with older workers of similar type should be interpreted as short -
hand for some measure of social segregation.4 Finally, an important question is whether the
present model is indeed the appropriate one for the question we want to ask. More precisely,
this is a model where referrals a®ect distribution - distribution of pro¯ts between H ¯rms
and L ¯rms, between incumbent ¯rms and potential entrants, and distribution of wages
between di®erent workers - but do not a®ect e±ciency. All workers are always employed and
production always equals the total product of all H workers: there is no e±ciency rationale
to recommend shifting from referrals to a market-based transmission of information.5 On
the other hand, it is not clear that real world objections to preferential networks are based
4For a thorough recent survey of the evidence on social segmentation and social networks and especially
their role in labor markets, see Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004).
5Indeed, strictly speaking, signaling is inferior to referrals because of the lost costs ¸. In a full model,
costs ¸ would be paid to an education sector; here we could assume that they are redistributed to all agents,
but the step is trivial and we ignore it in what follows.
7on e±ciency: for the most part they are based on the belief that the network is advantageous
but exclusionary, and thus plays essentially an \unfair" redistributive purpose. It is this role
that is highlighted by the current model.
The solution of the model is straightforward, once the stochastic properties of the network
have been characterized. We begin then by studying the network, and in particular the
density of connections at each node that determines the probabilities of contacts between
young and old workers of the two types.
3 The Network
Because establishing a personal connection entails no cost and does not prevent the option
of signaling later, doing so is a weakly undominated strategy: if the young worker does not
receive a referral o®er, or if the o®er is inferior to the market wage, he can access the market.6
Thus we will study scenarios where all young workers establish a personal connection.
As mentioned above, the stochastic nature of the connections implies that some young
workers will ¯nd themselves linked to an older worker who has several other links, while
some older workers will have none. Consider then the probability that a young worker of
type i (i = H;L) will receive a referral o®er if the ¯rm employing the older worker he is
connected to chooses to hire through referrals - a probability we call pi.
With a very large number of workers and ¯rms, the density of connections at each old
worker node can be studied independently of the rest of the network. Suppose that the size
of each generation of workers is 2N, which then equals the number of active ¯rms. Any
young H worker has probability (®=N) of connecting to any speci¯c old H worker, while
the same probability equals (1 ¡ ®)=N for any young L worker. For large N, the number of
6This eliminates equilibria that seem rather trivial: where no networking takes place, because of pes-
simistic o®-equilibrium beliefs on the part of the ¯rms on the quality of any networking worker, or where
young workers randomize over networking with just the probabilities that lead H ¯rms to expect a refer-
ral worker to be equivalent to a market worker (thereby o®ering the market wage, and justifying workers'
indi®erence).
8ties connecting any individual old worker to young workers of either type is described by a
Poisson distribution: the probability that an old H worker has x ties to young H workers,
for example, is given by ®x
x! e¡®. It follows that the probability that the old H worker i is









































































pH = 1 ¡ e
¡1 (2)
The details of the derivation are in the Appendix (where in particular we show that
the error introduced by evaluating the expressions in the limit, as N approaches in¯nity, is
negligible). As intuition suggests, if all young workers network the probability of receiving a
referral, conditional on the ¯rm using referrals, is independent of the parameter ®: the value
of ® a®ects the composition of the pool of other young workers with which i must compete
for a referral, but not their expected number. Thus it is also the case that pH = pL, and in
what follows we will identify both terms by p ´ 1 ¡ e¡1. But recall once again that these
probabilities are conditional on the ¯rms using referrals and that H and L young workers











j!(k¡j)!®(k¡j)(1 ¡ ®)j = 1
9about their reliance on referrals. The characterization of the equilibria of the model, below,
will make this observation precise.
The stochastic nature of the network determines two further probabilities that will be
exploited repeatedly. It is convenient to derive them here. We just observed that some old
workers will have no ties to any young worker. Thus, from the point of view of the ¯rm, what
is the probability that their current employee of type i is able to recommend at least one
worker for possible hiring? In other words, what is the probability that the ¯rm's current
employee has at least one connection? Call such a probability Ái where i is the current
employee's type. An old H worker is linked to a young H with probability ®=N (since there
are N old H workers). Thus the probability that he has no connection to any young H
is given by (1 ¡ ®=N)N, the exponent now re°ecting the fact that there are N young H
workers. The probability that he has no connection to either a young H or a young L is
then (1 ¡ ®=N)N[1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)=N]N and thus ÁH; the probability that he has at least one
connection, can be approximated by:
ÁH = lim
N!1








N] = 1 ¡ e
¡1 (3)
Similarly ÁL = 1 ¡ e¡1 and again we will identify both ÁH and ÁL by Á ´ 1 ¡ e¡1.8
Finally, conditional on having at least one connection, what is the probability that an
old H worker making a random referral will choose a young worker of type H? Suppose
that the old H worker has k connections, and call such a probability ³k
HH. Recall that the
probability of having k connections can be approximated by °kH in equation (1). Hence, for
8Notice that there is no reason why p and Á should be equal in general, and indeed they would di®er if
the either group of workers did not network with probability 1. (See Casella and Hanaki, 2004).























































k! = ® 8k (4)
If we de¯ne ³k
ij as the probability that an old worker of type i having k connections and
making a random referral will choose a young worker of type j, the same procedure allows
us to derive immediately that ³k
HH = ³k
LL = ®, and ³k
HL = ³k
LH = 1 ¡ ® for all k.
It is the simple characterization of these probabilities that makes the model easy to solve.
The network, random but with a bias, combines the tractability of purely random networks
with the substantive concerns raised by in-breeding and selectivity.9
4 The Equilibria of the Model
Given our focus on equilibria where all workers establish personal connections, the only
decision workers have to take is whether to attempt certi¯cation if they are not hired through
referrals. The ¯rms, on the other hand, have to decide whether or not to attempt to hire
through referrals of their current employee, and if so, what wage to o®er. Each worker i's
9An interesting related literature studies the economic implications of di®erent network architectures, and
thus di®erent paths for the transmission of information. Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and Tassier
and Menczer (2004) are examples focused on labor markets.
11strategy is the probability with which he chooses to signal, si, while each ¯rm j's strategy
is the probability with which the ¯rm chooses to hire through referrals (conditional on its
current employee being connected to at least one young worker) rj and the referral wage wrj.
We focus on symmetrical equilibria where all workers of the same type and all ¯rms employing
the same type of workers follow the same strategy. In addition, given the stationarity of our
set-up, we restrict attention to stationary strategies that remain unchanged over time.10 If
we use the terminology "8i 2 H" to indicate all workers of type H, and "8j 2 H" to indicate
all ¯rms employing workers of type H (and similarly for L), then: sHi = sH 8i 2 H, sLi = sL
8i 2 L, rHj = rH and wrHj = wrH 8j 2 H, rLj = rL and wrLj = wrL8j 2 L. We neglect
the time subscript to emphasize that these strategies hold for all times. Call wC and wU the
wage for certi¯ed and uncerti¯ed workers in the anonymous market. An equilibrium is a set
of strategies f¾H, ¾L, rH, rL, wrH, wrLg, a pair of market clearing wages fwC, wUg and a set
of beliefs about the workers' types such that no worker and no ¯rm can strictly gain from
choosing a strategy di®erent from that assigned to his or its type, the labor market clears,
and all beliefs are rational.
Consider a scenario where ¯rms extend referral o®ers with probabilities rH and rL, and
workers who have not been hired through referrals attempt certi¯cation with probabilities
sH and sL. We can describe equilibrium wages and ¯rms' pro¯ts for generic values of these
probabilities. Given wages and pro¯ts, di®erent hiring strategies for ¯rms and signaling
strategies for workers can be posited, and the appropriate incentive compatibility constraints
identify the range of parameter values for which each equilibrium exists.
Examine the problem ¯rst from the perspective of the ¯rms. The worker they hire in
any given period is valuable both because of his own productivity and because of his ties
to younger workers in the future which will enable the ¯rm to hire through referrals, if
advantageous. Call VH the value of hiring a H worker, and ¦H the ¯rm's expected pro¯ts
10Each worker decides whether or not to signal only once, in the second and last period of their life. Firms
on the other hand are in¯nitely-lived and must decide whether or not to hire through referrals every period.
By restricting attention to stationary strategies, we reduce the set of strategies for a ¯rm of each type to a
single probability, ignoring time.
12from referrals from a current H employee (and similarly for VL and ¦L). Then:
VH = 1 + maxf0;±¦Hg
(5)
VL = maxf0;±¦Lg
where ± is the rate with which expected pro¯ts in the next hiring cycle are discounted.
Keeping in mind that pro¯ts from hiring in the market must be zero, expected pro¯ts from
referrals must equal the probability of hiring a worker whose value, combining productivity
and future referrals, is larger than the referrals wage. If we call hLH the probability of hiring
a L worker through referrals from a current H employee (and similarly for the other types),
then expected pro¯ts from referrals are:
¦H = hHH(VH ¡ wrH) + hLH(VL ¡ wrH)
(6)
¦L = hHL(VH ¡ wrL) + hLL(VL ¡ wrL)
where the results of the previous section imply:
hHH = hLL = ®Á = ®(1 ¡ e
¡1)
(7)
hLH = hHL = (1 ¡ ®)Á = (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ e
¡1)
Any ¯rm which attempts to hire through referrals o®ers a wage that must be weakly
smaller than the expected value of the referral. The wage must be acceptable to a H worker;
indeed, because our model gives ¯rms all bargaining power, it must be the lowest wage
13acceptable to a H worker and it must be identical for H and L ¯rms: wrH = wrL ´ wr.11
When some of the workers attempt certi¯cation, two di®erent markets exist, a market for
certi¯ed workers which clears at wage wC, and a market for uncerti¯ed workers, which clears
at wage wU. The extent to which the referral wage re°ects the wage for uncerti¯ed or
certi¯ed workers (net of certi¯cation costs) depends on the strategy followed by H workers
left in the market. Since a H worker attempting certi¯cation is successful with probability





¯wc + (1 ¡ ¯)wU ¡ ¸ if sH = 1
wU otherwise
(8)
The market wages re°ect the probabilities and the values of hiring workers of either type.
De¯ning hHU as the probability of hiring a H worker in the market for uncerti¯ed workers
(and similarly hLU), and hHC and hLC as the corresponding probabilities in the market for
certi¯ed workers, and keeping in mind that expected pro¯ts when hiring in the market are
zero:
wU = hHUVH + hLUVL = hHUVH + (1 ¡ hHU)VL = hHU(VH ¡ VL) + VL
wC = hHCVH + hLCVL = hHCVH + (1 ¡ hHC)VL = hHC(VH ¡ VL) + VL
These probabilities are given by the relative frequencies of workers of either type. For
example, if we de¯ne prob(CjH) (prob(CjL)) as the probability of being in the market for
certi¯ed workers conditional on being a H type (a L type), then:
11Even when L ¯rms choose to use referrals, and thus VL > 0, they must be driven by the goal of hiring a
H worker since L workers are not productive. If workers shared in the surplus generated by referral hiring,
the wage o®ered by H and L ¯rms would both be higher than the minimum acceptable wage for a H worker





Note that prob(CjH) is the joint probability of not having been hired through referrals and
being certi¯ed, conditional on being a H worker (and correspondingly for prob(CjL)). Thus:
prob(CjH) = [1 ¡ rH®p ¡ rL(1 ¡ ®)p](sH¯)
prob(CjL) = [1 ¡ rH(1 ¡ ®)p ¡ rL®p]sL(1 ¡ ¯)
Therefore:
wC =
[1 ¡ rH®p ¡ rL(1 ¡ ®)p](sH¯)(VH ¡ VL)







prob(UjH) = [1 ¡ rH®p ¡ rL(1 ¡ ®)p](1 ¡ sH¯)
prob(UjL) = [1 ¡ rH(1 ¡ ®)p ¡ rL®p][1 ¡ sL(1 ¡ ¯)]
Therefore:
wU =
[1 ¡ rH®p ¡ rL(1 ¡ ®)p](1 ¡ sH¯)(VH ¡ VL)
[1 ¡ rH®p ¡ rL(1 ¡ ®)p](1 ¡ sH¯) + [1 ¡ rH(1 ¡ ®)p ¡ rL®p][1 ¡ sL(1 ¡ ¯)]
+ VL
(10)
(Recall that, by equation (2), p = (1 ¡ e¡1)).
We can now write the incentive compatibility constraints for ¯rms and workers. Firms
15will use referrals only if it pro¯table to do so, or, taking (6) and (7) into account:
rH > 0 , ¦H = (1 ¡ e
¡1)[®VH + (1 ¡ ®)VL ¡ wr] ¸ 0
(11)
rL > 0 , ¦L = (1 ¡ e
¡1)[(1 ¡ ®)VH + ®VL ¡ wr] ¸ 0
Workers attempt certi¯cation if the cost of doing so is compensated by the di®erence in
the wages, or, given the di®erent probabilities of success for H and L workers:
sH > 0 , ¯wC + (1 ¡ ¯)wU ¡ ¸ ¸ wU
(12)
sL > 0 , (1 ¡ ¯)wC + ¯wU ¡ ¸ ¸ wU
The characterization of the economy is complete: the three di®erent wages are given by
(8), (9) and (10); the ¯rms' pro¯ts from referrals by equations (6); the value to the ¯rm
of hiring a worker of either type by (5) and ¯nally the incentive compatibility constraints
by (11) and (12). If all incentive compatibility constraints hold with strict inequality, the
equilibrium is in pure strategies, and the probabilities frH, rL, sH, sLg assume only 0 or 1
values; otherwise mixed strategies are possible.
As described earlier, once a candidate set of equilibrium strategies is posited, the incentive
compatibility constraints, evaluated at the correct wages, identify the range of parameter
values for which the strategies are indeed an equilibrium, if one such range exists. Di®erent
equilibria can exist for di®erent parameter values, or indeed multiple equilibria can occur
over the same range of parameters. The number of candidate equilibrium regimes is large,12
but some combinations of strategies can be ruled out ex ante. We can state:
12Without imposing any constraint, there are 34 combinations of candidate equilibrium strategies. Of
these, 24 correspond to pure strategy equilibria and the remainder have at least one set of agents randomizing.
16Lemma 1. (i) If sH = sL = 0, then rH = 1 and rL = 0; (ii) If rL > 0, then rH = 1;
(iii) If sL > 0, then sH = 1; (iv) if sH 2 (0;1), then rH = 1.
The lemma is proved in the Appendix, but the logic behind the four observations is not
di±cult to see. The ¯rst point states that in the absence of signaling H ¯rms strictly bene¯t
from hiring through referrals, while L ¯rms do not. The reason is that, absent signaling, H
¯rms have a higher probability of hiring a productive worker through referrals than in the
market, while the opposite is true for L ¯rms.13 The second point follows immediately from
the fact that it is always better to hire a H worker than a L worker: since the probability
of doing so through referrals is always higher for H ¯rms, the incentive to use referrals must
always be strictly higher for H ¯rms. Similarly, if any worker incurs the positive costs of
attempting certi¯cation, the market wage for certi¯ed workers must always be strictly higher
than the wage for uncerti¯ed workers, and since the probability of success, upon attempting
certi¯cation, is always higher for H workers, the incentive to signal must be strictly higher for
H workers. Finally, we know from (i) that H ¯rms always rely on referrals in the absence of
signaling. If sH 2 (0;1), then sL = 0 (by (iii)), and ¯rms can o®er as referral wage the market
wage for uncerti¯ed workers. Because some H workers, and only some H workers, exit the
uncerti¯ed workers pool, the referral wage is lower than in the case of no signaling, while the
expected productivity of a referral hire for H ¯rms remains constant at ®. If referrals were
pro¯table in the absence of signaling, they must be pro¯table when sH 2 (0;1).
It is possible to analyze systematically each candidate equilibrium and the range of pa-
rameter values that support it, but given the equations derived above the procedure is
mechanical and rather tedious. We limit ourselves to two examples.
13The hiring decisions of H ¯rms are strategic complements. Given that other H ¯rms hire through
referrals, and L ¯rms do not, hHU < 1=2 < ®. Thus a H ¯rm bene¯ts from using referrals. For L ¯rms, it
is not di±cult to verify that in this scenario hHU > (1¡®) (see the Appendix). Thus it is preferable to hire
in the market.
174.1 Example 1. Equilibrium with referrals and no signaling.
The workers' choice not to signal can be supported in equilibrium for all parameter
values: given ¸ > 0, o®-equilibrium beliefs on the part of the ¯rms according to which
anybody deviating must be an L type are su±cient to induce rational workers not to signal,
independently of their type. Lemma 1 states that in such a scenario if an equilibrium exists
it must be such that H ¯rms use referrals while L ¯rms do not. The question then is
the identi¯cation of the range of parameter values for which these latter strategies are an
equilibrium. We can state:
Lemma 2. For all ® > 1=2, ¸ > 0, and ± 2 [0;1], there exists an equilibrium where
sH = sL = 0, rH = 1 and rL = 0.
Proof. In principle, a ¯rm can envision any deviating path, extending into the future:
a once-for-all deviation where the ¯rm takes as given its own future strategy, a permanent
deviation where the ¯rm envisions changing its strategy forever, or indeed any repeated
deviation over any subset of future periods, and this for either of the ¯rm's future types.
In our stationary environment, however - where all other agents repeat the same strategy
and a single deviating ¯rm is negligible - the gain from repeated deviations is only the
appropriately discounted sum of the gain from a once-for-all deviation. Ruling out the latter
is thus su±cient to rule out any other pattern of deviation.14
Consider ¯rst the scope for deviation by a H ¯rm - the gain from foregoing referrals.
The ¯rm will deviate if current expected pro¯ts from referrals are negative, taking as given
its future strategy. Along the candidate equilibrium path VL = 0 and the individual ¯rm's
deviation has no e®ect on the market wage, and thus on the referral wage. Deviation is
pro¯table if ¦H = (1 ¡ e¡1)(®VH ¡ wr) < 0, or substituting sH = sL = rL = 0, rH = 1 and
14Although the intuition seems clear, the question arises because a ¯rm's pro¯ts from deviation depend
on the ¯rm's own future expected strategies - the value of making referrals, which a®ect today's pro¯t from
referrals, depends on the ¯rm's future strategies. This leads to questioning whether a permanent deviation,
for example, could be more advantageous that a once-for-all deviation. It is possible to show, however, that
this can occur only if the permanent deviation per se is not pro¯table. Since in addition deviation for a ¯xed
number of periods implies a once-for-all deviation at the end of the planned horizon, the conclusion in the
text holds: ruling out once-for-all deviations is su±cient to rule out any other pattern of deviation.









But VH ¸ 1 and the second parenthesis is positive for all ® > 1=2. Deviation cannot be
pro¯table.
Consider now the gain from deviation for a L ¯rm - the gain from switching to using
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a condition that is violated for all ® > 1=2. Deviation by either type of ¯rm is then ruled
out.¤
This is the equilibrium discussed by Montgomery in his original paper. In the absence
of signaling, it is the unique equilibrium of the model (as implied by Lemma 1): H ¯rms
always attempt to hire through referrals and L ¯rms never do. Expected pro¯ts are zero for
L ¯rms, who hire on the open market, but are positive for H ¯rms and equal to the expected
pro¯ts from referral hiring. From equation (6):
¦H =
(e ¡ 1)(2® ¡ 1)
(1 + e) ¡ ±(e ¡ 1)(2® ¡ 1)
The value of hiring a H worker is given by:
VH =
1 + e
(1 + e) ¡ ±(e ¡ 1)(2® ¡ 1)
and the wage by:
wU = wr =
e ¡ ®(e ¡ 1)
(1 + e) ¡ ±(e ¡ 1)(2® ¡ 1)
19As expected, the value of a H worker is higher than his personal productivity (VH > 1)
for all ® > 1=2 because employing a H worker leads to a higher than random chance of hiring
a H worker in the following period. This e®ect is more important the higher is ® - the higher
the probability that connected agents are of the same type - and the higher is ± - the less the
future is discounted. The pro¯t from referral hiring accrues entirely to the ¯rm and is given
by ¦H, an expression increasing in ® and ±, like VH and for the same reasons. The wage, on
the other hand, is declining in ®: it would equal 1=2 if ® equalled 1=2 because referral hiring
by H ¯rms would then not a®ect the average productivity of the market pool, but its value
falls monotonically at higher ® values re°ecting the increased selection of young H workers
out of the market. Because the wage re°ects not only the probability but also the value
of hiring a H worker in the market, it is increasing in ± - it is higher the less the future is
discounted. Note that the expected wage is identical for H and L workers, a consequence of
our granting all bargaining power to the ¯rm when hiring through referrals and a conclusion
that would be easily reversed in favor of a referral premium if referred workers shared in
the surplus.15 With the only noticeable di®erence that the direction of the network links
we have posited strengthens the bargaining position of the ¯rms, this equilibrium essentially
replicates Montgomery's results.
4.2 Example 2. Equilibrium with signaling and no referrals.
Can signaling support an equilibrium where referrals are not advantageous? Lemma 3
provides the answer:
Lemma 3. For all ® > 1=2, ± 2 [0;1], there exists an equilibrium where sH = 1, sL = 0,
rH = 0 and rL = 0 if ¯ ¸ 2®=(1 + ®) and (1 ¡ ¯)=(2 ¡ ¯) · ¸ · ¯=(2 ¡ ¯).
In this scenario, all certi¯ed workers must necessarily be H types and ¯rms can, if they
15If workers hired through referrals had more bargaining power than our model grants them, equilibrium
strategies would be unchanged but their own wage would be higher than the market wage. The market
wage would be lower, re°ecting the lower value to the ¯rm of hiring a H worker, but would again depend
negatively on ®.
20so choose, guarantee themselves a new H worker.16 To verify that it is an equilibrium, notice
¯rst that since no pro¯ts are available to ¯rms though referral hirings, VH = 1 and VL = 0.
The wages for certi¯ed and uncerti¯ed workers are given by (9) and (10) above: because all
certi¯ed workers are of type H, their value is fully re°ected in the market wage, wC = 1,
while wU = (1 ¡ ¯)=(2 ¡ ¯). The incentive compatibility constraints for the workers (12)
impose a ¯rst set of constraints on parameters:









With ¯ > 1=2, there is a non-empty range of ¸ values for which the two constraints can both
be satis¯ed.
Consider the potential for deviation by the ¯rms. Any ¯rm willing to hire through refer-
rals would need to o®er a wage acceptable to H workers, who prefer to attempt certi¯cation.
Hence, from (8), wr = ¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)2=(2 ¡ ¯) ¡ ¸. Because the incentive to use referrals is
always larger for H ¯rms (see Lemma 1), ruling out deviation by a H ¯rm is su±cient to
rule out deviation by a L ¯rm. As earlier, it is su±cient to focus on once-for-all deviations.
A H ¯rm will switch to using referrals if ¦H = (1 ¡ e¡1)[® ¡ wr] > 0. Thus equilibrium
requires:




1 ¡ 2® + ¯®
2 ¡ ¯
(14)
Because (13) and (14) must both be satis¯ed, this equilibrium exists if (1¡¯) · (1¡2®+¯®),
or ¯ ¸ 2®=(1 + ®).¤
For a suitable range of parameter values, the candidate equilibrium indeed exists: signal-
16The only other candidate equilibrium where all certi¯ed workers are guaranteed to be of H type has
strategies sH 2 (0;1) and sL = 0. But then we know by Lemma 1 that rH = 1: if an equilibrium exists,
referrals must take place.
21ing provides separation of the workers' types, in the limited sense that all certi¯ed workers
must be of type H, and ¯rms refrain from using referrals and prefer to hire in the market, an
option they would not take in the absence of signaling. Signaling provides information and
supplants the use of personal referrals. Notice that hiring in either market, for certi¯ed or
uncerti¯ed workers, leads to zero ¯rm pro¯ts, and thus ¯rms are indi®erent between paying
the premium attached to certi¯cation, and guaranteeing themselves a H worker, or hiring a
cheaper uncerti¯ed worker with a lower but positive probability of being a H type. But hir-
ing an uncerti¯ed worker in this equilibrium is not equivalent to hiring an uncerti¯ed worker
when no signaling takes place: the more precise information re°ected in the wage makes this
option superior to referrals in this equilibrium but inferior when no signaling takes place.
Notice however that the range of parameter values for which the equilibrium exists is
surprisingly limited. Since ® > 1=2, ¯ cannot be smaller than 2=3, and ¸ must fall in a
correspondingly narrow interval. Interestingly, the tight range of acceptable parameter val-
ues is mostly dictated by the incentive compatibility constraints ensuring that ¯rms refrain
from making referrals. In their absence, all values of ¯ > 1=2 could sustain the equilib-
rium (although the acceptable values of ¸ would remain quite limited). This suggests two
conjectures: ¯rst it seems likely that other equilibria exist, for ranges of parameter values
that may di®er from or overlap the range identi¯ed here, where signaling provides separation
between the workers' types but ¯rms still choose to make referral o®ers.17 Second, notice
that the ¯rms' incentive compatibility constraints select values of ¸ close to the lower bound
of the interval satisfying the workers' incentive constraints. A higher ¸ would induce ¯rms
to deviate. This is an interesting point, beginning to suggest the resilience of referrals in
our model: when ¯ is not very high, signaling can be informative only if ¸ is high enough
to induce separation of workers' types. But if ¸ is high, signaling is informative but also
expensive: referral hiring can undercut it and be less precise but preferable. We make this
17The existence of such equilibria does not follow immediately from a violation of the ¯rms' incentive
compatibility constraints in the candidate equilibrium studied. The composition of the markets, the wages
and thus all constraints would re°ect the di®erent ¯rms' strategies.
22conjecture more precise in the next section.
5 Reliance on Personal Connections when Signaling is
Informative.
Having veri¯ed that signaling can come to eliminate the recourse to personal referrals, we
now focus on the opposite question. Under what conditions is the availability of a signaling
mechanism compatible with continued reliance on referrals? And if reliance on referrals
continues to exist, does signaling a®ect referrals indirectly, by in°uencing the quality of
referral hiring, i.e. the percentage of referrals falling on workers of di®erent type?
Some scenarios are trivial: if the cost of signaling ¸ is very low, and the probability
of success ¯ not very di®erent across types (¯ close to 1=2), then all workers may choose
to signal, but certi¯cation is uninformative and H ¯rms continue to prefer hiring through
referrals (and the more so the higher is ®). The question becomes interesting if we restrict
attention to equilibria where signaling is informative, where we use the strict criterion that
only H workers attempt to signal (sH > 0, sL = 0) because in these equilibria signaling is
informationally superior to referrals.
The ¯rst result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For all ® 2 (1=2;1), there exist equilibria where signaling is perfectly
informative and ¯rms strictly prefer to hire through referrals.
The proof, in the Appendix, amounts to showing the existence of one such equilibrium.
In particular, we focus on the case ¯ = ® and on strategies fsH = 1, sL = 0, rH = 1, rL = 1g
- H workers in the market prefer to signal, L workers do not, and all ¯rms prefer to hire
through referrals - and show that for all ® 2 (1=2;1) there exists a non-empty range of ¸
values for which such strategies are indeed equilibrium strategies. The case ¯ = ® is chosen
primarily because it simpli¯es the algebra and the presentation of the results, but is also
a natural reference point: the exogenous precision of the personal connections equals the
exogenous precision of the signal. The assumption does not imply that personal connections
23and signaling are constrained to be equally informative because the signaling mechanism has
one additional element, the cost ¸, which leads to self-selection in the decision to engage in
signaling - hence the possibility that signaling be perfectly informative even for ¯ very close
to 1=2, as in the equilibrium described here. Because we are evaluating equilibria over the
whole range of possible ¸ value, the restriction ¯ = ® is compatible with a large number
of scenarios, while leaving the model ex ante unbiased. We will use it repeatedly as our
reference case.
Although the proof selects one particular example, in fact there are several equilibrium
regimes where signaling is informative and ¯rms prefer to use referrals - equilibria where only
H ¯rms use referrals, or where a share of them do so while L ¯rms hire in the market, or where
all H ¯rms and a share of L use referrals, or equilibria where only a share of H workers signal,
while L workers do not. The range of parameter values for which referral hiring takes place
and is imprecise, while ¯rms could guarantee themselves H workers is far from limited or
special. Figure 1 shows equilibrium strategies in ¸¡® space in the case ¯ = ® and ± = 0:90.
The model is obviously very stylized, but we can read parameter values keeping in mind that
the unit of time is the hiring cycle, or more precisely the length of employment of a worker at
a single ¯rm. The di®erence in productivity between a productive and unproductive worker
over that cycle is normalized to 1. Thus if we think of the time horizon as about ¯ve years,
± = 0:90 corresponds to a yearly discount rate of 2 percent.18 The parameter ¸, the ¯xed
cost of certi¯cation, can be thought of as the cost of further education, for example college,
and should be read relative to 1: ¸ = 1 in our model represents the case where the cost
of college education equals the total di®erence in productivity between a productive and a
non-productive worker over ¯ve years. As we saw, in the presence of referrals the value of
a worker to the ¯rm includes the value of future referral hiring, and thus the premium that
¯rms may be willing to pay to college educated workers may be well above the one-cycle
di®erence in productivity, implying in turn that acceptable values of ¸ in our model may
18Our qualitative results are e®ectively insensitive to the speci¯c value we assign to ±, for all ± 2 [0;1].
24well be above 1.
Figure 1a depicts workers' strategies, and ¯gure 1b ¯rms' strategies. As mentioned earlier,
there is always an equilibrium without signaling, supported by ¯rms' negative o®-equilibrium
beliefs. In Figure 1a, we have allowed signaling to take place whenever it can be supported
in equilibrium, with rational beliefs.19
The ¯gures show that there is a large area of the parameter space for which signaling
takes place and is fully informative. Workers signal when the cost ¸ is not too large; if
the precision of the signal (¯, which in the ¯gure equals ®) is high, only H workers signal,
and they do so for a large range of ¸ values; if on the contrary ¯ is low, then signaling can
occur only if ¸ is low, and for most of these values signaling is not informative because the
incentives to signal are very similar for H and L workers.20 Unless ¯ is high, informative
signaling requires intermediate values for ¸, low enough to be a®ordable by H workers, but
high enough to discourage L workers. As for referrals, the immediate observation from Figure
1b is that there is no equilibrium where ¯rms do not use referrals: over the entire parameters
range, referrals never cease to be pro¯table for ¯rms, whether signaling is informative or not,
whether ¸ is high or low, whether ® and ¯ are high or low. The ¯gure relies on ® = ¯, and
thus, as made clear by the equilibrium with no referrals characterized in the previous section,
the result is not general. But given our emphasis on the ® = ¯ case as plausible unbiased
reference, we emphasize this conclusion in a separate proposition, proved in the Appendix:
Proposition 2. Suppose ® = ¯. Then there exist equilibria where signaling is perfectly
informative, but there are no equilibria where referrals are not used.
Upon a moment of re°ection, the reason is obvious: unless ¯ is high, when signaling is
informative it is also rather expensive (¸ is high), expensive enough to allow H workers to
19No signaling is the unique equilibrium in the area left white: a worker of either type would not want to
attempt certi¯cation even if ¯rms, o®-equilibrium, expected any certi¯ed worker to be of type H. A second
equilibrium, with sH 2 (0;1) and sL = 0, exists in the region bordering the upward sloping frontier between
the white and gray areas in Figure 1a. The ¯gure omits it for ease of reading.
20When ¯ is close to 1=2, the probability of success upon signaling are very similar for H and L workers,
but the wage premium for certi¯ed workers is small. At high ¯, the premium is high but the probability of
success for a L worker is low. The incentive to signal for L workers is maximal for intermediate values of ¯.
25di®erentiate themselves. Market wages for certi¯ed workers compensate them for the cost
of certi¯cation, and thus tend to be high. Firms may well prefer the less informative but
cheaper reliance on referrals. In the trade-o® between information and cost, cost becomes
the deciding factor. The conclusion always holds when ® = ¯ because informative signaling
can be cheap only when its precision is high, but if the precision of referral hirings is also
correspondingly high, then the cost advantage, small at it may be, remains the dominant
consideration.
The ¯rms' equilibrium strategies are particularly interesting when ¯ (and ®) are low.
There is then a range of parameter values where, if signaling occurs in equilibrium, all ¯rms
hire through referrals (the black area in ¯gure 1b), including L ¯rms, which never use referrals
in the absence of signaling because referrals give them a more than even chance of hiring an
unproductive worker. As stated in the following proposition (proved in the Appendix):
Proposition 3. Signaling, including informative signaling, may induce L ¯rms to hire
through referrals.
Once again, the reason is the market premium for certi¯ed workers. Indeed, Figure 1b
makes clear that such an equilibrium occurs when, for each ® and ¯, ¸ approaches its highest
acceptable value. Because certi¯ed workers must be compensated for the cost of signaling,
the areas where L ¯rms use referrals correspond to those ranges of parameter values where
the certi¯cation premium is highest. When ® = ¯, L ¯rms' incentive to use referrals is
maximal when ® is close to 1=2: the bias inherent in referral hiring is not too strong, while
referrals allow ¯rms to avoid the premium for certi¯ed workers and still hire workers of higher
average productivity than in the uncerti¯ed market.
What is remarkable about this equilibrium is that the existence of signaling, and in
particular of informative signaling, leads to an increase in ¯rms' reliance on referrals. In
fact, if ® = ¯ signaling always weakly increases the expected proportion of workers hired
through referrals: either referral hiring is used by H ¯rms alone, as in the absence of signaling,
or it is used by both H ¯rms and some positive share of L ¯rms (possibly all).
26This observation allows us to address a question we raised at the beginning of this section:
how does signaling a®ect the quality of referral hiring? The answer is an immediate corollary
to Proposition 3:
Corollary to Proposition 3. Signaling always weakly lowers the quality of referral
hirings.
Since only H ¯rms recur to referrals in the absence of signaling, any expansion of referral
hiring to L ¯rms necessarily lowers the average productivity of workers hired through refer-
rals. Paradoxically then, signaling not only does not eliminate referrals, but in fact may lead
to increased reliance on personal connections, and lower expected productivity of referral
hires.
We have phrased our discussion mostly in terms of the ® = ¯ case, but the results
generalize predictably when we loosen this constraint. To generate transparent ¯gures, we
can specialize the model in a di®erent direction. Figure 2 describes equilibrium strategies
for workers (¯gure 2a) and ¯rms (¯gure 2b) for arbitrary values of ¯ and ¸ when we ¯x ® at
0:75 (and ± at 0:90, as earlier).21 Figure 2a is very similar to ¯gure 1a: signaling can occur
in equilibrium only if the cost ¸ is not too high, where the highest acceptable ¸ increases
with ¯; if ¸ is low, both types of workers have an incentive to signal.22 The di®erence is
in ¯gure 2b. First, of all, there are now equilibria without referrals, when ¯ is high (higher
than ®) and ¸ low - the area left white in the lower right corner of the ¯gure. This is the
equilibrium with no referrals and informative signaling discussed in section 4.2, and a second
equilibrium with no referrals and all workers signaling when ¸ is particularly low. The low
¸ makes the ¯rms' savings from referral hirings negligible, and the high ¯ makes signaling
21As in Figure 1a, a second equilibrium, with sH 2 (0;1) and sL = 0, exists in the region bordering the
upward sloping frontier between the white and gray areas in Figure 2a. Again the ¯gure omits it for ease of
reading.
22The sensitivity of the acceptable ¸ range to ¯ is reduced, relative to the case where ® = ¯. At low ¯
but constant ® (and H ¯rms only using referrals), equilibrium market wages are lower than they would be
if ® equalled ¯, keeping certi¯cation valuable and raising the highest acceptable ¸. At high ¯, the e®ect
is reversed: with constant ®, smaller than ¯, market wages for uncerti¯ed workers are now higher and the
incentive to signal is reduced, reducing in turn the highest acceptable ¸.
27a good channel of information, even in the absence of full separation.23 It is clear from
the ¯gure though that even in the area where ¯ > ® (¯ > 0:75), the absence of referrals
remain a rather special case. Second, the equilibrium where both H and L ¯rms rely on
referrals now is concentrated mostly in an area of high ¯ and ¸ values. With ® = 0:75, L
¯rms are discouraged from using referrals unless the savings from doing so are substantial:
a range of high ¸ and ¯ where signaling still occurs, the certi¯cation premium is high, and
the composition of the uncerti¯ed labor pool worse than when hiring through referrals.
We can now provide a summary answer to our original question: does the availability
of signaling lead ¯rms to forego referrals? More precisely, how large is the region of the
parameters space where equilibria without referrals can be supported? Figure 3 shows the
full three-dimensional picture, for ® and ¯ between 1=2 and 1, and ¸ between 0 and 2:5, with
± = 0:90.24 On the left-hand side, in grey, is the space where referrals do not take place, as
function of the three parameters. Notice the two requirements ¯ > ® and, simultaneously, ¸
small. For comparison, the right-hand side shows the parameters space where signaling takes
place in equilibrium, a much larger fraction of the total space. The darker shade of grey
shows, in both cases, regions where signaling is exclusive to H workers: in the overwhelming
majority of this space referrals continue to be employed.
6 Discussion
Armed with these results, we can ask other questions. For example, what is the e®ect
of making certi¯cation less expensive - reducing ¸? Will personal connections become less
important in labor markets? According to our model, the answer is not immediate, because
it depends both on the precision of the information inherent in the personal network and
23When only H workers signal, all certi¯ed workers must be H types, but the composition of the uncerti¯ed
labor pool and the di®erence in wages still depend on ¯. Similarly, when all workers signal, some L workers are
expected to become certi¯ed, but the composition of the two labor pools, and the wages, remain signi¯cantly
di®erent if ¯ is high enough.
24As mentioned earlier, results show little sensitivity to ±.
28on the standards used in certi¯cation. Lowering certi¯cation costs reduces the self-selection
that limits L workers' attempts to signal, and thus, ceteris paribus, reduces the information
conveyed by being certi¯ed. Only when the signal is in itself precise enough, relative to the
network, to limit the importance of this e®ect - when ¯ >> ® - does the cheap availability
of public information reduces the reliance on personal connections. But the opposite option
of making certi¯cation more expensive - increasing ¸ - relying then on the information
provided by self-selection, never reduces the use of personal referrals. On the contrary, it
tends to increase the use of referrals, even when they are known to lead to a less than
average probability of hiring productive workers. Similarly, what is the e®ect of increasing
the standards for certi¯cation - increasing ¯? Again, the answer depends on other factors
too. Only when certi¯cation is both rigorous and cheap does it become a preferred option to
personal referrals. We can also interpret the parameter ® as correlated to the openness of a
society - the more open and diverse, the lower the \in-breeding bias" and the less predictable
the \quality" of a personal referral. Not surprisingly, the model tells that at high ®, in a
predictable and segregated society, it is very di±cult to substitute personal referrals with
markets - the information transmitted through personal connections is just too cheap and
too accurate. But as the society becomes more open, diverse and mixed, that value of social
contacts falls. With appropriate institutions - with high ¯ and low ¸ signaling - markets can
emerge.
A more ambitious task is linking the results of our model to the regularities that have
emerged from the empirical literature on the use of social contacts in labor markets.25 The
least controversial observation is the negative correlation between the use of social ties in
¯nding employment and the workers' education level (for example Staiger, 1990, for the
US, and Pellizzari, 2003, for European countries), an observation that ¯ts well the story
told in this model: incomplete information prevents the ¯rms' full knowledge of workers'
25Again Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) provide a careful survey. Some recent works are Bentolila,
Michelacci and Suarez (2004), Pellizzari (2003), Pistaferri (1999), Santamaria-Garcia (2003), Sylos Labini
(2004).
29characteristics, and referrals and education are two alternative means of partly revealing
such characteristics. Referrals and education are substitutes - as they are in our model
where workers hired through referrals can forego the step of obtaining a certi¯cation. In
a particularly detailed data set on Italian college graduates, a more speci¯c ¯nding is the
reduced reliance on social ties in professions like engineering and medicine, relative to social
sciences or literature.26 According to our model, the di®erence can be read in terms of
¯: either because the standards are tougher or because pro¯ciency is more precisely de¯ned,
in medicine and engineering certi¯cation is a more precise measure of skills - ¯ is higher -
than in social sciences or literature. At low ¸ - at low cost of public education in Italy - the
di®erence has a direct impact on the reliance on social ties.
The empirical ¯nding that has received most attention and has been most disputed is
the existence of a systematic premium paid to workers hired through referrals. A positive
premium was found by the ¯rst US studies (for example Granovetter (1974), Corcoran et al.
(1980) and Staiger (1990)), but has since been disputed. Bentolila et al. (2003) suggest a
negative premium, while Pellizzari (2003) and Santamaria-Garcia (2003) ¯nd no systematic
relation, once workers' and jobs' characteristics are controlled for.27 Figure 4 depicts the
referral wage and the market wages in our model. The top row (¯gures 4a) reports the
referral wage and the average market wage as function of ¯, on the left, and as function of
¸, on the right; the central row (¯gures 4b) distinguishes between the two market wages, for
certi¯ed and for uncerti¯ed workers, and the bottom row (¯gures 4c) compares the referral
wage to the average market wage of H workers and L workers separately.28 The discontinuity
points correspond to changes in equilibrium strategies, which can be read from Figure 2; at
high values of ¸ multiple equilibria are possible, as shown in all ¯gures on the right-hand
side of Figure 4. All the ¯gures support the di±culties found by researchers in identifying a
26Sylos Labini (2004), based on the ISTAT Survey of Italian college graduates, 1998.
27Sylos Labini (2004) makes the interesting point that not all social ties are equivalent: family ties and
professional ties, in particular, may transmit quite di®erent information. In his analysis of Italian data on
college graduates, the negative premium is limited to jobs found through family ties.
28The ¯gures should be read keeping in mind that the referral premium would be higher if workers hired
through referrals shared in the surplus.
30systematic bias. The ¯rst row of ¯gures suggests that if the referral wage is simply compared
to the average market wage (a not unreasonable comparison in our model where there is only
one type of job), the results are ambiguous: the direction of the bias depends on parameters.
If these parameters plausibly di®er across sectors and/or across countries, the conclusion
con¯rms the heterogeneity across sectors and countries found by the literature. Controlling
for the workers' characteristics ¯rst appears to yield cleaner results: all referral o®ers are
made to uncerti¯ed workers and the premium, relative to the market wage for uncerti¯ed
workers only, is unambiguously positive (¯gures 4b). But certi¯cation in our model is only
an imperfect signal of workers' productivity, and the fact that all referrals are made to
uncerti¯ed workers is an artifact of the timing of the model. A better analysis would try to
control for workers' unobservable characteristics - here their productivity. Figures 4c show
that the referral wage has a positive premium for L workers for most parameter values - i.e.
it is higher than the market wage they would expect to receive - but has a discount for H
workers. Again, as in the literature, the results are not consistent across di®erent groups of
workers, with discounts more probable in the case of more productive hires (as reported by
Pellizzari, 2003, for example). Of course we are aware that the model is extremely stylized
and these results, although suggestive, should be taken with care.
7 Conclusions
This paper has studied the extent to which ¯rms and workers' reliance on networks of
personal connections as channels of information about jobs is weakened by the availability
of a signaling mechanism. The signaling mechanism is available to all but is costly, and its
outcome is an imperfect signal of the worker's true productivity. The network on the other
hand is free and connects a young worker to someone who is currently employed and whose
productivity is known by the ¯rm. Because connections are more likely between similar
agents, the existence of a tie provides information to the ¯rm about the productivity of
31the young worker. We have found that although signaling can transmit information more
precisely - because the cost induces workers to self-select - reliance on the network is very
robust: only for a very small fraction of the parameters space of the model do referrals
disappear.
The analysis was motivated by the desire to compare the network, possibly successful but
exclusionary, to a market mechanism, open to all and anonymous. In fact, to the extent that
they convey any information at all, both mechanisms must di®erentiate between di®erent
types of workers, a bias summarized in the model by the two parameters ® and ¯. In what
sense then is signaling in our model a \market mechanism" while the network is not? There
are two main di®erences. First, the cost involved in the decision to signal plays a central role
in the revelation of information - contrary to the case of free personal connections. Second,
the information revealed by the network is local, whereas the information transmitted by the
signal is global - a sentence that could be rephrased more precisely by plausibly de¯ning the
information as \veri¯able" in the signaling case, and \non-veri¯able" in the network case.
In our model, the implication is that in the market ¯rms compete for the surplus from the
revelation of information, but they do not in the network.29 It is the ¯rms' open entry into
the market that at the end fundamentally distinguishes the two mechanisms.
Other market-type mechanisms seem possible and interesting. The most obvious one,
closest in spirit to the Rauch (2001) and to our knowledge neglected by the formal literature
on referrals in labor market, is a pro¯t -driven intermediary: an employment agency. How
would such an intermediary function in this model? Could it take over successfully the
functions ful¯lled by the network? We leave the answer to future research.
29Some competition among ¯rms would result if the direction of the ties were reversed, from old to young
workers, as in Montgomery's original paper. But the e®ect is only partial.
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35A Appendix
Probability that a young worker receives a referral o®er, conditional on ¯rms
using referrals.
The exact probability that an old worker of type H (of which N exist) has k connections


























c ´ min(k ¡ j;N ¡ 1)
d ´ min(j;N)

























is the limit of (A1) as N tend to in¯nity and has well established bounds of error. For



















































- i.e. the error introduced by the approximation does not distort the sum.
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Setting x = 1:














Proof of Lemma 1. (i) When sH = sL = 0,we can write:
¦H = Á(VH ¡ VL)(® ¡ hHU)
(A3)
¦L = Á(VH ¡ VL)(1 ¡ ® ¡ hHU)
and
hHU =
1 ¡ rH®p ¡ rL(1 ¡ ®)p
2 ¡ rHp ¡ rLp
(A4)
We proceed in two stages. First we show that (VH ¡ VL) > 0 always. Then we show that
¦H > 0 and ¦L < 0 always. (1) If rL < 1, VL = 0 and VH ¸ 1, hence (VH ¡ VL) > 0. If
rL = 1, there are two possibilities: (a) if rH < 1, then ¦H = 0 and VH = 1. In this case,
VL = ±Á(1 ¡ ® ¡ hHU)=(1 ¡ ±®) < 1 for all ± · 1. Hence (VH ¡ VL) > 0. (b) If rH = 1
and ¦H > 0, then, by (5) and (A3) above, (VH ¡ VL) = 1 + ±Á(VH ¡ VL)(2® ¡ 1) > 0.
Thus we can conclude that in all cases, (VH ¡ VL) > 0. (2) From (A4), @hHU=@rH < 0,
and @hHU=@rL > 0. Thus hHU is maximal at frH = 0, rL = 1g and minimal at frH = 1,
rL = 0g: hHU 2 [hHU, hHU], where hHU ´ (1¡®p)=(2¡p) and hHU ´ [1¡(1¡®)p]=(2¡p).
But ® > hHU and (1¡®) < hHU for all ® > 1=2. Since (VH ¡VL) > 0, we can then conclude
that ¦H > 0 and ¦L < 0 always. If an equilibrium exists, it must have rH = 1 and rL = 0.
(ii). Suppose rL 2 (0;1) and ¦L = 0. Then, by (6), VL = 0; but since VH ¸ 1, VH > VL.
By (6) then ¦H > 0 and rH = 1. Suppose rL = 1 and ¦L > 0. Could it be that ¦H · 0? If
so, VH = 1 and VL = ±(1¡e¡1)(1¡®+aVL¡wr), or VL = ±(1¡e¡1)(1¡®¡wr)=(1¡±®) < 1
for all ± · 1 and wr ¸ 0. But if VH > VL it must be that ¦H > ¦L by (6), a contradiction.
Hence if rL = 1 and ¦L > 0, ¦H > 0 and rH = 1.
38(iii) By (12), signaling by either type of workers requires wC > wU for all ¸ > 0. But
then, since ¯ > 1=2, the incentive to signal is always strictly higher for a H worker than a
L worker, and the conclusion follows.
(iv) If sH 2 (0;1), then wr = wU = hHU(VH ¡VL)+VL and ¦H = Á(VH ¡VL)(®¡hHU).
By result (iii) in the Lemma, if sH 2 (0;1), then sL = 0, hence
hHU =
(1 ¡ rH®p ¡ rL(1 ¡ ®)p)(1 ¡ sH¯)
(1 ¡ rH®p ¡ rL(1 ¡ ®)p)(1 ¡ sH¯) + (1 ¡ rH(1 ¡ ®)p ¡ rL®p)
(A5)
It is then easy to verify that @hHU=@sH < 0, and since ® > hHU(sH = 0), a fortiori ® >
hHU(sH > 0), ¦H > 0 and rH = 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the proposition, it is su±cient to show the existence of
some such equilibrium. Consider the candidate scenario fsH = 1, sL = 0, rH = 1, rL = 1g,
where H workers in the market always signal but all ¯rms always prefer hiring through
referrals. Suppose ¯ = ®. Equations (5) (6) (8) (9) and (10) yield VH, VL, ¦H, ¦L, wr, wU,
and wC. The incentive compatibility constraints (11) and (12) allow us to conclude that
such scenario is an equilibrium if and only if ¸ 2 [¸;¸] where:
¸ = maxf
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ hUH)
1 ¡ ±Á(2® ¡ 1)
;
2® ¡ 1 + (1 ¡ ®)hUH









The unique upper bound is given by the requirement that ¸ should be low enough for
H workers to be willing to signal; and the lower bounds by the incentive compatibility
constraints on the L workers and the L ¯rms (¸ should be high enough for L workers not to
39signal and L ¯rms to prefer referrals)31 It is not di±cult to verify that for all ® 2 (1=2;1),
¸ is larger than either of the two lower bounds (the relevant lower bound is the ¯rst for
® · 2 ¡
p
2 and the second for higher ®). The incentive compatibility constraints are
satis¯ed and the scenario is an equilibrium for all ® 2 (1=2;1). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. The existence of equilibria where signaling is perfectly informative
has been established in Proposition 1. Consider now possible equilibria where referrals are
not used. By Lemma 1, if sH = sL = 0, then rH = 1; if sH 2 (0;1), then rH = 1, and
if sL > 0, then sH = 1. Thus the only workers' strategies compatible with the absence
of referrals are: fsH = 1, sL = 0g, fsH = 1, sL 2 (0;1)g, and fsH = 1, sL = 1g. The
¯rst case is the only one of the three possibilities where signaling is perfectly informative
and referrals do not take place. It was studied in detail in the text, and we showed there
that the equilibrium requires ¯ ¸ 2®=(1 + ®) > ® 8® 2 (1=2;1), and thus is ruled out if
® = ¯. Proving that the latter two candidate scenarios cannot be equilibria amounts once
again to showing that the incentive compatibility constraints must be violated. Deriving
such constraints requires working through the appropriate wage and pro¯ts equations for
each scenario, but given equations (5), (6), (8), (9) and (10) the derivation of the constraints
is trivial, and we leave the details to the reader. In the second scenario, fsH = 1, sL 2 (0;1),
rH = rL = 0g, the two binding constraints are that L workers must be indi®erent about
signaling, while H ¯rms must prefer not to use referrals, or:
¸ =
(1 ¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU)
1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ e¡1)[® ¡ (2¯ ¡ 1)hHC ¡ 2(1 ¡ ¯)hUC]
(A6)
¸ < ¯(hHC ¡ hHU) + hHU ¡ ® ´ ¸ (A7)
31If the incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that the L ¯rms' strategy is a best response is satis¯ed,




¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)sL
hHU =
1 ¡ ¯
1 + (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ sL)
For any given ¸, (A6) identi¯es the equilibrium sL, as long as (A7) is satis¯ed. Substituting
® = ¯ and (A7) in (A6), we can write:
¸ =
(1 ¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU)
1 + ±(1 ¡ e¡1)[(1 ¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU) ¡ ¸]
or:
¸ >
(1 ¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU)
1 + ±(1 ¡ e¡1)[(1 ¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU) ¡ ¸]
(A8)
It is not di±cult to verify that for all sL 2 (0;1), (1 ¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU) > ¸. Hence (A8)
implies
±(1 ¡ e
¡1)[(1 ¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU) ¡ ¸]¸ > [(1 ¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU) ¡ ¸]
a condition that can only be satis¯ed for ¸ > 1. But for all sL 2 (0;1), hHC > hHU,
implying ¸ < hHC ¡¯ < 1. The scenario cannot be an equilibrium when ® = ¯. In the third
scenario, fsH = 1, sL = 1, rH = rL = 0g, if H ¯rms do not use referrals it must be that:
¸ < ¯(2¯ ¡1)+1¡¯ ¡®. If ® = ¯ the constraint becomes ¸ < (¯ ¡1)(2¯ ¡1) < 0, which
is violated for all ¸ > 0, ¯ 2 (1=2;1).
Proof of Proposition 3. The same argument used to prove Proposition 1 proves Propo-
sition 3.¤
41(a) Equilibrium Signalling








All the H and some L workers
All the H but no L workers
No worker
(b) Equilibrium Referral








All the H and some L ¯rms
All the H but no L ¯rms
Figure 1: (a) Equilibrium signaling and (b) referral in ® ¡ ¸ space for ® = ¯ and ± = 0:90.
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All the H and some L workers
All the H but no L workers
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(b) Equilibrium Referral






All the H and some L ¯rms
All the H but no L ¯rms
Some H ¯rms
No ¯rm
Figure 2: (a) Equilibrium signaling and (b) referral in ¯¡¸ space for ® = 0:75 and ± = 0:90.
43No referrals Positive Signalling
Figure 3: The space of parameters where equilibria without referrals exist (left) and where
equilibria with signaling exist (right). Darker grey correspond to informative signaling (sL =
0). ± = 0:90
44(a) Average market wage and referral wage
For ¸ = 0:25, varying ¯ For ¯ = 0:75, varying ¸












(b) Market wage for certi¯ed and uncerti¯ed workers and referral wage
For ¸ = 0:25, varying ¯ For ¯ = 0:75, varying ¸
















(c) Average market wage for H and L workers and referral wage
For ¸ = 0:25, varying ¯ For ¯ = 0:75, varying ¸














Figure 4: (a) Average market wage (black) and referral wage (gray). (b) Market wage for
certi¯ed workers (black, solid), market wage for uncerti¯ed workers (black, dashed), and
referral wage (gray). (c) Average market wage for H workers (black, solid), average market
wage for L workers (black, dashed), and referral wage (gray). Notice the multiple equilibria
in the ¯ = 0:75 ¯gures at high values of ¸. For all ¯gures ® = 0:75 and ± = 0:90
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